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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code 
Annotated, and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. WHETHER THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE BARS SME'S DIRECT AND ASSIGNED 
NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS AGAINST REAVELEY AND EPPICH. 
H. WHETHER SME HAS ENFORCEABLE THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY 
CONTRACT RIGHTS AGAINST REAVELEY OR EPPICH. 
Standard of Appellate Review 
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Glover By and Through Dyson v. 
Bov Scouts. 923 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1996). An issue of fact is "material" when the dispute 
involves an issue of fact upon which the outcome of the litigation depends. See Dupler v. 
Yates. 10 Utah 2d 251, 269, 351 P.2d 624, 637 (1960V In reviewing the trial court's order 
granting summary judgment, this Court considers the evidence and the inferences fairly arising 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party below. LMV Leasing. Inc. v. Conlin. 805 
P.2d 189, 192 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); see also Doit. Inc. v. Touche. Ross & Co.. 926 P.2d 835, 
838-839 (Utah 1996). 
Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law, this Court accords 
no deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented. Glover Bv and Through 
Dvson. 923 P.2d at 1385; Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 
1989). This Court "determines only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law 
1 
and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact." Id; 
LMV Leasing. Inc.. 805 P.2d at 192. 
The applicability of the economic loss rule and the resulting preclusion of claims 
can be determined as a matter of law. See American Towers Owners Assoc. Inc. v. CCL 
Mechanical. Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182, 1188-1189 (Utah 1996). In making this determination, this 
Court does not grant the trial court's ruling on this issue any deference. Id. at 1189 (citing 
Higgins v. Salt Lake county. 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993)). 
"Whether a third-party beneficiary status exists . . . can be decided on summary 
judgment as question of law and this Court has frequently affirmed those legal determinations on 
review for correctness." American Towers Owners Assoc. 930 P.2d at 1188 (quoting Ron Case 
Roofing & Asphalt Paving. Inc. v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385-1386 (Utah 1989)); Wasatch 
Bankv. Surety Ins. Co.. 703 P.2d 298, 300 (Utah 1985)). 
Issues not raised in appellant's main brief or the docketing statement generally are 
not considered by this Court on appeal. See, Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan. 818 P.2d 1316, 
1320 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ETC, 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
This case involves an action for alleged delay damages and other purely economic 
losses incurred by SME as a result of a construction project known as the Salt Palace Renovation 
and Expansion Project (the "Project"). (Plaintiffs Amended Complaint at fs 13, 20. R. 42, 43.) 
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This action was instituted by SME Industries in 1998 and this appeal was from the Trial Court's 
Order of September 21, 1999, granting Summary Judgment in favor of all named defendants in 
this case. (Addendum B to Appellant's Brief R, 746-752.) 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below, 
L On April 24, 1998, SME Industries filed its Complaint instituting an action 
for delay damages and other economic losses allegedly sustained on the Project. R. 1-25. 
2. On or about August 31, 1998, SME Industries filed its Amended 
Complaint in this action. R.39-62. 
3. On September 14, 1998, Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Associates, 
Inc., and Robert Norman (collectively "TVSA") filed their Motion to Dismiss SME Industries' 
Complaint or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment. R.63-65; 66-120. 
4. Also on September 14, 1998, Gillies Stransky Brems Smith Architects, and 
Jonathan Bradshaw (collectively "GSBS") filed their Motion to Dismiss SME Industries's 
Complaint or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment, with supporting memorandum and affidavits. 
R.121-124; 125-140; 141-218. 
5. On September 17, 1998, Reaveley Engineers & Associates, Inc. and Earl S. 
Eppich filed their Motion to Dismiss SME Industries' Complaint, or for Summary Judgment. 
R.219-221; 222-399; 400-401. 
6. Oral argument on these motions was held before the Hon. David S. Young 
on April 9, 1999. R. 763. 
7. On September 21, 1999, the Trial Court entered an Order granting 
summary judgment in favor of all named defendants. R. 746-752. 
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8. SME Industries filed a notice of appeal on or about October 5, 1999. R. 
753-755. 
C Statement of Facts, 
1. Reaveley Engineers and Associates, Inc. ("Reaveley") is a Utah 
corporation in good standing which is and at all times relevant hereto was engaged in providing 
structural engineering design and related services. [AfF. of Ronald J. Reaveley at % 2, R. 241.] 
2. At all times relevant hereto, Earl S. Eppich ("Eppich") was an employee of 
Reaveley. [A£,R.242.] 
3. In 1992, the County and TVSA entered into a written contract whereby 
TVSA agreed to provide architectural and related services to the County related to the Project 
and the County agreed to compensate TVSA therefor. [Amended Complaint at % 16, R. 42.] 
4. On or about July 30, 1992, TVSA and Reaveley entered into a written 
contract whereby Reaveley agreed to provide structural engineering design and related services to 
TVSA related to the Project and TVSA agreed to compensate Reaveley therefor. [Reaveley AfF. 
at % 5; Amended Complaint at % 18, R. 43.] 
5. Thereafter, TVSA and Reaveley entered into various amendments or 
modifications to their contract. [Reaveley AfF. at %&. 5-8, R. 241-242] 
6. By its contract with TVSA, Reaveley did not intend to directly benefit 
anyone other than TVSA with its performance under said contract. [Id at % 11, R. 242] 
7. The County and Hughes-Hunt entered into a contract whereby Hughes-
Hunt agreed to construct the Project and the County agreed to compensate Hughes-Hunt 
therefor. [Amended Complaint at % 21, R. 43.] 
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8. Thereafter, Hughes-Hunt and SME entered into a subcontract whereby 
SME agreed to furnish, fabricate and erect structural steel for the Project and Hughes-Hunt 
agreed to compensate SME therefor. [Amended Complaint at % 22-25, R. 43-44.] 
9. Reaveley does not have and has never had a contract of any nature 
whatsoever with SME, the County, or Hughes-Hunt regarding the Project. [Reaveley AfF. at % 
12, R. 242.] 
10. Eppich does not have and has never had a contract of any nature 
whatsoever with SME, the County, or Hughes-Hunt regarding the Project. [AfF. of Earl S. Eppich 
at ^  2, R. 401.] 
11. SME's Complaint as against Reaveley and Eppich seeks damages for 
additional costs allegedly incurred by SME in performing its work under its subcontract with 
Hughes-Hunt and/or similar economic damages allegedly incurred by Hughes-Hunt and the 
County. [Amended Complaint at 1fs. 38, 41-43, 46, and 48, R. 46-48.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The essence of SME's claim is that it cost more to perform its subcontract with 
Hughes-Hunt due to the alleged errors or omissions of Reaveley, Eppich, and the other 
defendants/ appellees. SME asserts two basic theories of liability against Reaveley and Eppich: 
professional negligence and breach of third-party beneficiary contract. SME is asserting not only 
the direct claims it has, if any, against Reaveley and Eppich under these theories, but the assigned 
claims, if any, that the County and/or Hughes-Hunt may have against Reaveley and Eppich. Thus, 
SME is asserting the professional negligence claims, if any, that it, the County, and/or Herm-
5 
Hughes may have against Reaveley and Eppich, as well the third-party beneficiary contract claims, 
if any, that it, the County, and/or Hughes-Hunt may have against Reaveley and Eppich. 
SME, the County, and Hughes-Hunt are not party to the TVSA-Reaveley contract 
or the Reaveley-Eppich contract, nor do any of them have any other contractual privity with 
Reaveley or Eppich germane to this dispute. Thus, the claims that SME asserts against Reaveley 
and Eppich are asserted in the complete absence of any privity of contract with Reaveley and 
Eppich. 
The fundamental issue presented to the court is whether claims for purely 
economic losses (i.e., purely financial losses not associated with physical injury to person or 
property) in the contract-intensive construction industry will be governed by the contracts 
wherein the claimant's economic expectations were created, as trial court decided, or by third-
party tort and contract principles which would allow the claimant to ignore its contract and 
impose its economic expectations upon third persons with whom it did not contract. 
The lack of privity between SME and/or its assignors on the one hand, and 
Reaveley and/or Eppich on the other, coupled with the fact that SME's claimed losses are purely 
economic in nature, bars SME direct and assigned professional negligence claims as a matter of 
law under Utah's economic loss doctrine or rule. The economic loss rule bars unintentional tort 
claims seeking recovery of purely economic losses in cases involving the design and construction 
of improvements to real property. The rule insures the integrity and predictability of contracts in 
a contract-intensive industry by restricting the protection of the economic expectations arising out 
these contracts to that afforded by the contracts themselves. 
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As for SME's direct and assigned third-party beneficiary contract claims, Utah law 
requires that SME demonstrate that TVS A and Reaveley and/or Reaveley and Eppich in their 
respective written contracts clearly intended at the time of contract to confer a separate and 
distinct benefit directly upon SME and/or its assignors (i.e., the County, and/or Hughes-Hunt). 
SME has not and can not make this showing and the contracts themselves manifest a contrary 
intent. Accordingly, SME's direct and assigned third-party beneficiary contract claims fail as a 
matter of law. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Trial Court correctly concluded that all of SME's 
claims against Reaveley and Eppich are barred as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE BARS SME'S DIRECT AND ASSIGNED 
PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS AGAINST REAVELEY AND 
EPPICH. 
A. Overview: the Contracts Involved. 
Neither Reaveley nor Eppich had a contract with SME, the County, or Hughes on 
the Project. SME does not allege the existence of any such contracts, nor does the appellate 
record contain any evidence of any such contracts. Indeed, in its Statement of Facts in its 
Appellant's Brief4, SME identifies only five contracts: 
(1) a contract between Salt Lake County and TVS A for architectural, engineering, and 
services ("the County-TVSA contract")2; 
1
 See also, Amended Complaint at % 16-18, 21, 25, R. 42-44. 
2
 Appellant's Brief, at p. 5; Ex. C to Appellant's Brief. 
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(2) a contract between TVSA and Reaveley for structural engineering services ("the 
TVSA-Reaveley contract")3; 
(3) a contract between TVSA and GSBS for architectural and other services ("the 
TVSA-GSBS contract")4; 
(4) a subcontract agreement between SME and Hughes-Hunt ("the Hughes-SME 
contract")5; and 
(5) the assignment/settlement agreement between SME, Hughes-Hunt, and the County 
("the Assignment").6 
In short, there is no dispute as to whom contracted with whom or that SME, the County, and 
Hughes-Hunt did not have a contract with Reaveley or Eppich.. 
In addition to the lack of a contractual relationship between Reaveley and Eppich 
on the one hand, and SME, the County, and Hughes-Hunt on the other, SME also does not 
dispute that it seeks purely economic damages in this action. Nonetheless, SME contends that its 
claims for economic loss should be allowed on the grounds that the economic loss rule in the 
context of claims between non-owner participants in design and construction is either inapplicable 
or subject to one or more exceptions. This argument is without merit. 
3
 Id. at p. 6; Ex. D to Appellant's Brief. 
4
 Id. at p. 7; Ex. E to Appellant's Brief. 
5
 Id. at p. 8. 
6
 Id at p. 9. 
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B. Utah's Economic Loss Rule, 
Under the economic loss rule as adopted in Utah, "one may not recover 
'economic' losses under a theory of negligence." American Towers Owners Association. Inc. v. 
CCI Mechanical. Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Utah 1996). Economic losses are defined as: 
"[D]amages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective 
product, or consequent loss of profit. . . without any claim of personal injury or 
damage to other property — as well as 'the diminution in the value of product 
because it is inferior in quality and does not work for the general purposes for 
which it was manufactured and sold.'" 
Id (quoting Maack v. Resource Design and Construction. Inc.. 875 P.2d 570, 579 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994)). 
In American Towers, a condominium owners association brought suit against, 
inter alia, the persons who designed and/or constructed the plumbing and mechanical systems of 
a condominium complex. American Towers. 930 P.2d at 1184. The association had no contract 
with any of the design/construction defendants. Id at 1187. It sought as damages in negligence 
the cost of repairing the alleged defects and diminution in the value of the condominiums due to 
those defects. Id at 1184. The trial court in American Towers dismissed the association's 
negligence claims based upon the economic loss rule and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed, 
reasoning: 
The policy reasons supporting the economic loss rule are sound. * * * [C]ontract 
principles resolve issues when the product does not meet the user's expectations, 
while tort principles resolve issues when the product is unsafe to person or 
property.* * * 
The law of torts imposes no standards upon the parties' performance of the 
contract; the only standards are those agreed upon by the parties. * * * 
Otherwise, the extension of tort law would result in "liability to an indeterminate 
amount for an indeterminate time to an independent class." 
Id at 1185, 1190 (citations omitted). 
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Here, SME claims that Reaveley's and Eppich's structural steel design and related 
services performed under the TVSA-Reaveley contract did not meet SME's expectations. On its 
face, this claim is barred by the economic loss rule. 
SME devotes a large part of its appellate brief trying to put the economic loss rule 
in what SME claims is its "historical" (i.e., products liability) context7 and urges this Court to 
restrict the application of it decision in American Towers to cases involving 'products.' In a 
nutshell, SME contends that economic loss rule is restricted to cases involving "products", the 
components of which are not separately purchased by the claimant8, and that the American 
Towers decision is inapplicable because it deals solely with defeated expectations in the purchase 
of'products.'9 
The American Towers opinion however does not classify the condominium units at 
issue as 'products' as that word is used in describing the evolution of the economic loss rule. To 
the contrary, while the American Towers opinion traces the economic loss rule to its roots in 
products liability law, it specifically notes that the case before it involved allegations of "negligent 
design and construction of improvements to real property, not the negligent manufacturing of a 
product." American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1190; see also Maack, 875 P.2d at 581; Schafir v. 
Harrigaa 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1994). Here, SME alleges, inter alia, negligent design of 
improvements to real property. 
7
 Appellant's Brief, at pp. 21-26. 
8
 Appellant's Brief at pp. 26-31. 
9
 Id 
10 
Further, despite SME's contrary assertions, the American Towers decision clearly 
contemplates that the economic loss rule has broad application in design and construction. 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, "[the] rationales [for the economic loss doctrine] are 
particularly applicable to claims of negligent construction. Construction projects are 
characterized by detailed and comprehensive contracts that form the foundation of the industry's 
operations." Id at 1190 (emphasis added). The Court added that "[contracting parties are free 
to adjust their respective obligations to satisfy their mutual expectations." Id Recognizing these 
realities, the American Towers court concluded that relief for defeated economic expectations 
under a design or construction contract was to come from the contract itself and not from third 
parties. To conclude otherwise, the court reasoned, would impose the claimant's "economic 
expectations upon parties whom the ... [claimant] did not know and with whom they did not deal 
and upon contracts to which they were not a party." Id. at 1192. 
C. The Economic Loss Rule and Public Policy. 
It is clear from an objective reading of this court's opinion in American Towers 
that neither the decision nor its underlying reasoning is nearly as limited as SME suggests. To the 
contrary, the court took an appropriately broad view of the fundamental proposition put forth by 
the claimants in American Towers - that the economic expectations generated under a design or 
construction contract can under an unintentional tort theory be imposed upon others with whom 
the claimant did not contract and upon contracts to which the claimant was not party - and its 
potential impact on the contract-intensive construction industry. With this view, this court 
rejected the notion that the participants in the design and construction of a project have a legal 
duty to protect the economic expectations of remote third parties. 
11 
SME's fundamental proposition is materially identical to the proposition rejected 
by this court in American Towers. SME contends that a participant in design or construction has 
a duty to protect a third party's economic expectations even though that participant: (i) may not 
even not know the identity of the third party its economic expectations at the time the duty is 
imposed; (ii) was not party to the contract wherein the claimant's expectations were created and 
had no opportunity to weigh the reasonableness of those expectations or to knowingly or 
voluntarily accept or reject the duty to protect them, and; (iii) contracted only to protect the 
economic expectations of the party with whom the participant contracted. These are the very 
factors which caused the American Towers court to adopt the economic loss rule. 
SME's argument that there is danger in an "unprincipled extension" of the 
economic loss rule10 is misplaced (if self-evident), as no extension of the economic loss rule is 
either sought or necessary. The rule already encompasses and bars SME's claims and SME seeks 
to restrict its application. In this vein, it is equally self-evident that there is danger in an 
unprincipled and blind imposition of third-party tort concepts upon contractual relationships. This 
court has always been reluctant to take this path.11 
Taken to its logical conclusion, SME's proposition would turn the contract-
intensive construction industry on its ear by undermining complex contractual relationships with 
overly-simplistic, third-party tort concepts. Specifically, it would: 
10
 Appellant Brief, at p. 31. 
11
 See, Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d 214, 217-18, n. 3 (Utah 
1984)(this court has never blended tort and contract concepts to allow products liability for purely 
economic injuries). 
12 
1. impose upon each participant in design and construction a legal duty to 
protect the unidentified and indeterminate economic expectations of every other project 
participant; 
2. superimpose this duty on top of a party's contractual duty to protect the 
economic expectations of the party with whom it has contracted, creating a conflict of 
interest wherein a party often could not fulfill one duty without violating the other; 
3. impose the unidentified and indeterminate economic expectations created 
under each design and construction contract on a project upon every other design and 
construction contract on the project, undermining or even negating the allocation of 
economic opportunity and risk in the latter; 
4. deny project participants an opportunity to assess the reasonableness of 
these remote economic expectations they are charged to protect and determine if and how 
they wish to contract in view of such expectations; 
5. abrogate bargained-for or anticipated protections in design and 
construction contracts by imposing tort liability and damage risks otherwise limited or 
excluded by contract or contract law; 
6. effectively create a new tort of unintentional or negligent interference with 
contract in an industry where a single project may encompass literally dozens of contracts; 
7. effectively create a 'super class' of third party beneficiaries by effectively 
conferring enforceable third party beneficiary contract rights upon third parties who, under 
well-established legal principles; are otherwise only incidental third party beneficiaries of a 
13 
contract; yet would not confine those rights to the parameters agreed to by the contracting 
parties themselves.12 
Simply stated, SME would have Utah law relegate contracts and the intentions of 
contracting parties in the contract-intensive construction industry to a secondary and largely 
inconsequential role. It is clear from a considered reading of the American Towers decision that 
this court would not and should not countenance such a result. 
The Washington Supreme Court, referencing two of its prior opinions also relied 
upon by the Utah Supreme Court in American Towers, discussed this same issue as follows: 
We follow the Stuart and Atherton line of cases and maintain the fundamental 
boundaries of tort and contract law by limiting the recovery of economic loss due 
to construction delays to the remedies provided by contract. * * * We hold the 
parties to their contracts. If tort and contract remedies were allowed to overlap ... 
[the] construction industry in particular would suffer, for it is in this industry that 
we most clearly see the importance of the precise allocation of risk by contract. 
The fees of architects, engineers, contractors, developers, vendors, and so on are 
founded on their expected liability exposure as bargained and provided for in their 
contracts. * * * We preserve the incentive to adequately self-protect during the 
bargaining process. * * * If we held to the contrary, a party could bring a cause of 
action in tort to recover benefits they were unable to obtain in contractual 
negotiations. *** There is a beneficial effect to society when contractual 
agreements are enforced and expectancy interests are not frustrated. In cases 
involving construction disputes, the contracts entered into among the various 
parties shall govern their economic expectations. The preservation of the contract 
represents the most efficient and fair manner in which to limit liability and govern 
economic expectations in the construction industry. 
Berschauer/Phillips Const. Co. v. Seattle School District No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 993 (Wash. 1994) 
(emphasis added). 
12
 The County-TVSA contract expressly provides "It is understood and agreed that the 
CONSULTANT'S services under this Agreement... shall not create for the CONSULTANT any 
independent duties, liabilities, agreements, or rights to or with the contractor, subcontractor, their 
employees, or any third persons." Reaveley's Memorandum in Support at Ex. A to Ex. 1, 
Control No. R00028, % III. A. 3. f. (10), R. 272. 
14 
SME's historical analysis of the economic loss rule is reasonably accurate and 
objective so far as it goes. However, SME ignores the fact that the economic loss rule, though 
rooted in products liability law, has frequently been applied by courts to bar not only owner 
negligence claims against design professionals (as in American Towers) but contractor and 
subcontractor claims against design professionals as well.13 See, e.g., Spancrete Inc. v. Ronald E. 
Frazier & Associates. P.A.. 630 So.2d 1197, 1198 (Fla.App. 1994) (design professional's duty of 
care does not extend to subcontractor and subcontractor's negligence claim against architect and 
engineer therefore barred by economic loss rule)14; Fleischer v. Hellmuth. Obata & Kassabaum. 
Inc.. 870 S.W.2d 832, 833 (Mo.Ct. App. 1993) ("an architect owes no tort duty of care and is not 
liable to a general contractor or construction manager for damages for economic losses arising as 
a result of the architect's negligent performance of its contract with the owner").15 
13
 Indeed, the economic loss rule bars unintentional third party tort claims against 
contractors and subcontractors as well. See, e.g., Calloway v. Citv of Reno. No. 25268, 2000 
Nev. LEXIS 24, 2000 WL 228641 (Nev. Feb. 29, 2000)(townhouse owner negligence claims 
against contractor and subcontractor barred by economic loss rule). 
14
 The Spancrete decision was not addressed, much less overruled, by the Florida supreme 
Court's recent decision in Moransais v. Heathman. 744 So.2d 973 (Fla. 1999). Moransais 
involved a homeowner's claim against engineers who made a pre-purchase inspection of the 
owner's house pursuant to their employer's contract with the homeowner. Id. at 974-975. The 
Florida Supreme Court explicitly stated that "[it] hesitate[d] to speculate further on situations not 
actually before us." Id. at 983. As it did before the trial court, SME misstates the rule of law in 
Florida contending that a subcontractor such as SME can recover purely economic losses from a 
design professional under a negligence theory. In fact, Spancrete bars such claims. 
15
 See also Floor Craft Floor Covering. Inc. v. Parma Community General Hospital. 560 
N.E.2d 206 (Ohio 1990)(contractor's negligence claim against architect barred by economic loss 
rule); Blake Construction Co. v. Alley. 353 S.E.2d 724, 727 (Va. 1987)(architect has no common 
law duty to protect contractor against purely economic loss); Berschauer/Phillips v. Seattle 
School District. 881 P.2d 986 (Wash. 1994)(contractor's negligence claim against architect and 
engineer barred by economic loss rule); Rissler & McMurrv Co. v. Sheridan Area Water Supply 
Jt. Powers Board. 929 P.2d 1228 (Wyo. 1998)(contractor's negligent design claim against 
15 
Simply stated, the economic loss rule in design and construction cases as 
envisioned by the American Towers court is not nearly so limited as SME suggests, and clearly 
encompasses the third party negligence claims of all participants in design and construction. 
D. SME's Claims for Professional Negligence Were Properly Dismissed Under 
Utah's Economic Loss Rule, 
SME claims that Reaveley and Eppich in performing the TVSA-Reaveley contract 
failed to adequately develop their designs and otherwise interfered with SME's work. This 
alleged negligence, SME contends, defeated its economic expectations under its subcontract with 
Hughes-Hunt by causing delays and loss of productivity and necessitating out-of-sequence and 
acceleration of work, the costs of which SME wants to recover.16 SME makes similar claims 
regarding the County and Hughes-Hunt, whose claims have been assigned to SME. All of these 
claims are asserted in the absence of any privity with Reaveley and Eppich and are barred by 
Utah's economic loss rule. 
Conveniently, SME fails to distinguish its direct negligence claims (i.e., SME's 
claim that Reaveley and Eppich breached a legal duty to protect SME's economic interests) from 
its assigned negligence claims (i.e., SME's claim that Reaveley and Eppich breached a legal duty 
to protect the County's and Hughes' economic interests). This distinction is important in that the 
engineer barred by economic loss rule). See also, Pevronnin Construction Co. v. Weiss, 208 
N.E.2d 489 (Ind. 1965)(contractor v. engineer - no recovery in negligence); Delta Construction 
Co. v. Jackson. 198 So.2d 592 (Miss. 1967) (contractor v. engineer - no recovery in negligence); 
Linde Enterprises, Inc. v. Hazelton Citv Authority. 602 A.2d 897 (Pa. 1992) (contractor v. 
engineer - no recovery in negligence); Bernard Johnson. Inc. v. Continental Constructors. Inc.. 
630 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. App. 1982) (contractor v. architect - no recovery in negligence). 
16
 Sge, ££,, Amended Complaint at fflf 21,27,28,33,34,38,41-43,46,58,76,82-84,86,88-
91, 99-100, R. 43-48, 50, 53, 55-57, 59. 
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County-assigned negligence claim presents circumstances materially identical to those present in 
American Towers. 
In American Towers, the Utah Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the economic 
loss rule barred an owner's negligence claim for purely economic losses against design 
professionals with whom the owner had no contract. Id at 1191-1192. See also, Maacle 875 
P.2d at 573. Here, SME is asserting the assigned claim of the owner (the County) against design 
professionals (Reaveley and Eppich) with whom the owner had not contract. Simply stated, the 
economic loss rule bars any negligence claim for purely economic losses that the County, as the 
project owner, may have against Reaveley and Eppich, whether that claim is asserted by the 
County or by SME. 
A like result obtains as to SME's direct claims for professional negligence and the 
professional negligence claims assigned by Hughes-Hunt. The economic loss rule as enunciated in 
American Towers requires a party claiming defeated economic expectations under its design or 
construction contract to look solely to that contract for its remedy. In a design or construction 
setting, no unintentional tort claim exists for defeated economic expectations. Simply stated,, the 
economic loss rule bars any third party negligence claim for economic loss against Reaveley or 
Eppich. 
F. The So-Called Exceptions to the Economic Loss Rule, 
SME argues that its direct or assigned negligence claims against Reaveley are 
covered by so-called exceptions to the economic loss rule, including: (i) the "special relationship" 
17 
exception, and/or; (ii) the "negligent misrepresentation" exception.17 Neither of these exceptions 
has ever been recognized in Utah in the context of the economic loss rule or in claims against 
design professionals, and both are contrary to the fundamental policy underlying the economic 
loss rule. 
1. The Special Relationship Exception. 
The essence of SME's special relationship argument is that the economic loss rule 
should not apply where a defendant, "by virtue of [his] special activities, professional training or 
other unique preparation for their work" knows or has reason to know that his negligence may 
cause economic harm to others.18 SME tacitly seeks to limit this exception to claims against 
design professionals, but the exception if it applies can not and should not be so limited and 
should apply to contractors, subcontractors, and other industry professionals as well. Indeed, if 
fairly applied the 'special relationship' exception would consume the rule. 
Again, this supposed exception applies where the defendant can reasonably 
foresee, based upon his training and experience, that his negligence on a project could 
economically harm another. Design professionals, contractors, subcontractors, and owners all 
arguably fall into this category. All but owners are typically licensed by the state and undergo 
testing as a prerequisite to licensure19, and all know or should know that what they do or don't do 
on a project can affect others' economic interests in the project. According to SME, a design 
17
 These so-called exceptions, along with a third, were presented separately in the trial 
court, but have lumped together here by SME. 
18
 Appellant's Brief at p. 25. 
19
 Utah Code Ann. §§58-3a-101, et seq. (architects), §§58-22-101, et seq. (engineers), 
and §§58-55-101 etseq. (contractors, subcontractors, and construction trades). 
18 
professional who negligently fails to timely and/or properly perform its contractual duties should 
be liable for economic harm caused to third parties. Why shouldn't this same rationale apply to 
contractors and subcontractors who similarly fail in the performance of their contractual duties 
and cause economic harm to others? 
Thus, taken to its logical conclusion, SME's 'special relationship' exception to the 
economic loss rule would effectively consume the economic loss rule and allow third party 
negligence claims for purely economic damages forseeably caused by or to, inter alia: owners; 
construction managers; sureties; design professionals (of any tier); contractors; subcontractors (of 
any tier); lenders; property managers, and; tenants. It takes no imagination to envision the 
mischief to be wrought if the law were as SME says it should be, allowing as it would any project 
participant who misjudged its economic expectations and risks on a project to go after any and all 
other participants in an effort to leverage a settlement and recoup losses that it itself caused. 
SME's proposed 'special relationship' exception would also create an 
irreconcilable conflict of interest for all project participants. For example, a design professional 
has a contractual duty to protect the economic interests of its client {e.g., the owner).20 These 
duties often require the design team to take positions contrary to the economic interests of 
contractors or subcontractors. Similarly, a subcontractor has a duty to protect the economic 
interests of the prime contractor with whom it has contracted and, in fulfilling this duty, the 
subcontractor is often at odds with the economic interests of others, including the owner and the 
design team. 
20
 For example, design professional contracts almost uniformly require the design 
professional to protect the owner against construction defects or, as another example, verify that 
the contractor is entitled to the payment for which it has applied. 
19 
Nonetheless, in SME's construction world each project participant must play for 
both (or all) teams, having not only a contractual duty to protect its client's economic interests, 
but a legal duty to protect the economic interests of others who could forseeably suffer economic 
harm as result of the participants' supposedly negligent performance of those contractual duties. 
Indeed, whether or not the performance of a participant's contractual or legal duty is adequate or 
up to standard depends entirely upon the claimant's perspective of what that duty requires.21 
Setting aside for the moment the inherently unworkable nature of the 'special 
relationship' exception, none of the special relationship cases cited by SME involved third party 
claims against a design subconsultant such as Reaveley, much less a design subconsultant's 
employee such as Eppich. Most involved claims against 'supervising' design professionals; that 
is, architects or engineers who supervised the work of the contractor.22 SME cites no evidence 
that TVSA was a supervising architect, or that Reaveley or Eppich was a supervising engineer. 
Further, the cases cited by SME which actually support the 'special relationship' 
exception blindly apply traditional tort principles such as "foreseeability* with little or no regard 
for the implications of their holding upon the unique, contract-intensive nature of design and 
21
 For example, SME contends that the design team took too long to process its shop 
drawings and other submittals, even though the vast majority were processed well within the time 
allowed by the various contracts ad acceptable standards and no one but SME has claimed 
otherwise. 
22
 Berkel and Company Contractors, Inc. v. Providence Hospital, 454 So.2d 496, 503 
(Ala. 1984); United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132, 136 (S.D. Cal. 1958); A.R. 
Mover, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So.2d 397, 400-402 (Fla. 1973); Normovle-Berg & Associates, Inc. 
v. Village of Deer Creek, 350 N.E.2d 559 (111. Ct. App. 1976); Gurtler, Hebert and Co., Inc. v. 
Wevland Machine Shop, Inc., 405 So.2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Waldor Pump & Equipment 
Co. v. Orr Schelen-Maveron & Associates. 386 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Forte 
Brothers, Inc. v. National Amusements. Inc., 525 A.2d 1301 (R.I. 1987). 
20 
construction.23 The hazards of blindly applying third party tort concepts in design and 
construction cases are evident in decisions from other jurisdictions which have seriously 
considered the import of such an approach. See, e.g., Bernard Johnson, Inc. v. Continental 
Constructors, Inc.. 630 S.W.2d 365, 371-374 (Tex. App. 1982). 
In Bernard Johnson, the Texas Court of Appeals found many of the cases adopting 
the 'special relationship' exception lacking "in logical analysis; particularly because they ignore 
what seems ... a fundamental proposition: the architect's relation to the parties and the work is 
one specified by the contracting parties in their bargained-for agreement." Id at 371. Bernard 
Johnson involved a contractor's negligence claims against an architect. In Bernard Johnson, the 
Texas Court of Appeals categorically refused to adopt a general rule that an architect owes a duty 
of care to a contractor or subcontractor. Id at 373-374. In doing so it noted that the decisions 
adopting the broad "foreseeability" approach (advocated here by SME) are founded on a major 
but largely unarticulated premise that "all architects control the work of the contractor." Id at 
374 (criticizing several of the cases relied upon by SME). 
SME also suggests that imposition of tort liability based on the "special 
relationship" exception is warranted because "[architects and engineers typically have the power 
to compel a contractor or subcontractor to follow plans to the very detail" because they 
supposedly have of the power to stop work.24 (emphasis added) Thus, SME argues, contractors 
and subcontractors, unlike owners, "are a specifically identifiable class of plaintiffs", warranting 
23
 See, e.g., John Martin Co., Inc. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 428, 431-432, 435 
(Tenn. 1991) (basing its approach on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552); Jim's Excavating 
Service. Inc.. 878 P.2d 248, 253-255 (Mont. 1994). 
24
 Appellate Brief at p. 33. 
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imposition of a legal duty upon design professionals to protect the economic interests of those 
within that class. Having offered this argument, SME has not and can not demonstrate that 
Reaveley or Eppich had the power to compel SME to comply with the plans or the authority to 
stop work on this project, simply because they did not have any such authority. 
Further, SME has not and can not demonstrate that contractors and subcontractors 
are a more-identifiable class of plaintiffs than owners. It is generally anticipated on any project 
that unidentified contractors and subcontractors will build the project and that an owner and/or 
others will purchase or occupy the project upon completion. However, unlike contractors and 
subcontractors, the identity of the owner-occupant is often known before design even begins. 
Indeed, the owner-occupant is frequently the person who commissions the design. 
SME offers up other red herrings as well, at one point arguing that because shop 
drawings are a "subspecies of plans and specifications ... created for the use of a limited class", 
imposition of negligence liability for economic losses suffered by persons within that class is 
warranted.25 However, SME's implication that shop drawings are prepared by the design team is 
untrue. They are prepared by persons working under the general contractor's contract umbrella, 
such as subcontractors, fabricators, suppliers, or independent detailers contracted to such persons. 
SME also argues that the relationship between a contractor and a design 
professional may be suflSciently close to substitute for privity, justifying imposition of tort liability 
in the absence of contractual privity. Like the 'special relationship' exception, this so-called 
"near-privity" or "nexus" exception to the economic loss rule has never been recognized in Utah 
and, if adopted, would consume the rule itself. 
25
 Id. at p. 32. 
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The main case cited by SME in support of this argument involved the negligence 
claims of a general contractor for purely economic loss.26 Reliance Ins. Co. v. Morris Assoc, 
Inc., 607 N.Y.S.2d 106 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). Significantly, the Reliance case did not involve 
the claims of a subcontractor such as SME against a design subconsultant such as Reaveley or 
subconsultant employee such as Eppich. Rather, the plaintiff in Reliance was a prime contractor 
one contract removed from the defendant prime engineer (i.e., both were contracted with the 
owner). No such nexus or near privity exists here.27 Specifically, SME is three contracts 
removed from Reaveley (and four from Eppich), while Hughes is two contracts removed from 
Reaveley (and three from Eppich). 
Reliance is distinguishable on other grounds as well. For example, SME has 
neither alleged nor offered any evidence that its relationship and/or that of its assignors with 
Reaveley and Eppich "was so close as to approach privity." Reliance, 200 A.2d at 729. Further, 
a prior case also applying New York law held that there was not a sufficient nexus between a 
subcontractor and prime design professional to substitute for privity. Widett v. U.S. Fid.&Guar. 
815 F.2d 885, 886-87 (2d Cir. 1987). In short, even if applicable under Utah law, the 'near-
privity' or 'nexus' exception does not save either SME's direct (subcontractor vs. subconsultant) 
claims or the Hughes-assigned (contractor vs. subconsultant) claims. 
Other courts have flat-out rejected the 'nexus' or 'near privity' exception 
recognized by New York. For example, the Ohio Supreme Court has rejected the notion that the 
26
 Appellant's Brief at p. 25, n. 5. 
27
 While the County and Reaveley both contracted with TVSA, any County negligence 
claim against Reaveley is barred under American Towers as demonstrated above. 
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relationships between any member of the construction team and any member of the design team 
has sufficient nexus to substitute for privity. 
Although architects may anticipate that certain subcontractors will contribute to a 
construction project, the architect's services are generally extended to an 
unresolved class of persons unfixed in number. 
Floor Craft Covering, Inc. v. Parma Community General Hospital Ass'n.. 560 N.E.2d 206, 208-
211 (Ohio 1990). The Floor Craft court distinguished design professionals from another case 
applying Ohio law involving accountants, stating that in the latter instance "services were not 
extended to a faceless and unresolved class of persons, but rather to a known group possessed of 
vested rights, marked by a definable limit." Id. at 210. 
Ultimately, SME offers no legitimate explanation as to why design professionals 
generally or Reaveley or Eppich specifically had a so-called 'special relationship' or were in 'near 
privity' with SME, Hughes, or the County. It simply suggests that this court blindly recognize a 
blanket exception to the economic loss rule for design professionals.28 
2. The Negligent Misrepresentation Exception 
The other exception SME attempts to invoke is premised on the view that purely 
economic losses are recoverable under a negligent misrepresentation theory pursuant to Section 
552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. However, application of this supposed exception is 
unwarranted and should not be adopted by this Court in this case. 
SME correctly points out that Utah appellate courts have, under certain 
circumstances, implicitly recognized that economic losses are recoverable under a theory of 
28
 This court has already rejected one such invitation. American Towers, 930 P.2d at 
1191-92. 
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negligent misrepresentation. In some of these cases, the Utah court even relied upon Section 552, 
I 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.29 However, the economic loss rule was not at issue in any of 
these cases, nor did any of the cases cited involve contractor or subcontractor claims against 
design professionals. "In cases where a legal theory is not discussed in the opinion, that case is 
not controlling on a future case where the legal theory is properly raised." Berschauer/Phillips v. 
Seattle School District. 881 P.2d 986, 991 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (citing Webster v. Fall 266 
U.S. 507 (1925) (questions which merely lurk in the record, but are neither brought to a court's 
attention nor ruled upon, are not considered to have been decided so as to constitute precedent)). 
Other jurisdictions, having recognized and applied Section 552 in other cases, have 
refused to apply it in cases involving contractor or subcontractor claims against design 
professionals. See, e.g., Berschauer/Phillips. 881 P.2d at 989-93; Rissler & McMurrv Co. v. 
Sheridan Area Water Supply Joint Powers Bd.. 929 P.2d 1228 (Wyo. 1996). 
The Berschauer case is remarkably similar to the case at bar. In Berschauer. a 
contractor claiming additional costs in performing a construction contract asserted, inter alia, 
direct and owner-assigned negligence claims against design professionals. Id. The Washington 
Supreme Court, having previously applied the economic loss rule to bar owner negligence claims 
against design professionals in the absence of privity, applied the rule to bar both the direct and 
assigned negligence claims of the contractor against the design professionals. Id In rejecting the 
claimant's argument that purely economic losses were recoverable under a negligent 
misrepresentation theory pursuant to Restatement Section 552, the court stated: 
29
 Milliner v. Elmer Fox and co.. et aL 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974) (citing, inter alia, 
the tentative draft of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552). 
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when parties have contracted to protect against economic liability, as is the case in 
the construction industry, contract principles override the tort principles in §552 
and, thus, purely economic damages are not recoverable. Accord, Floor Craft 
Covering, Inc. v. Parma Community General Hospital Ass'n.. 560 N.E.2d 206 
(Ohio 1990)(§552 of the Restatement not adopted to allow general contractor to 
recover economic damages from a design professional); Williams & Sons Erectors. 
Inc. v. South Carolina Steel Corp., 983 F.2d 1176, 1181-83 (2d Cir. 1993)(under 
New York law, §552 not adopted to permit general contractor to recover 
economic damages from an architect) .... * * * 
There is a beneficial effect to society when contractual agreements are enforced and 
expectancy interests are not frustrated. In cases involving construction disputes, the 
contracts entered into among the various parties shall govern their economic expectations. 
The preservation of the contract represents the most efficient and fair manner in which to 
limit liability and govern economic expectations in the construction industry. 
M a t 993. 
In Rissler & McMurrv Co., a contractor (Rissler) entered into a detailed 
construction contract with the project owner which incorporated the plans and specifications 
provided by an engineer (HKM). Id. at 1231. During construction, Rissler encountered several 
alleged problems and later brought a claim against HKM for economic losses based on 
Restatement Section 552. Although the Wyoming Supreme Court, like Utah's appellate courts, 
had recognized Restatement §552 in certain circumstances on previous occasions, it rejected 
Rissler's negligent misrepresentation claim for economic loss. Id. at 1234-1235. In doing so, it 
stressed the distinction between the controlling policy considerations underlying tort law (safety of 
persons and property) and the controlling policy considerations underlying contract law 
(protection of expectations bargained for). Id. at 1235. The court further made the following 
crucial observation: "[the contractor] had the opportunity to allocate the risks associated with the 
costs of the work when it contracted with the [owner]... " Id 
Relying on Berschauer/Phillips, the Rissler court reasoned: 
26 
a bright line distinction between the remedies offered in contract and tort with 
respect to economic damages encourages the parties to negotiate toward the risk 
distribution that is desired or customary. In deference to the abilities of 
sophisticated businessmen to provide contractual remedies in their business 
dealings,... the contractor's claims against the architect [/engineer] must fail under 
the economic loss doctrine. 
Id 
Importantly, the appellant in Rissler made the same essential argument SME is 
making here30 (i.e., that Wyoming had previously recognized §552 in other circumstances and 
therefore should extend the scope of §552 to allow recovery for economic loss claimed by a 
contractor against an architect or engineer). Rejecting this argument, the Rissler court stated: 
"While we acknowledge that there may be circumstances under which purely economic damages 
may be a basis for an action under [Restatement Section 552], we will not allow Section 552 to be 
used as a method to sidestep contractual duties or to provide a scapegoat for self-inflicted 
damages. * * * [Our ruling] not only encourages the parties to negotiate the limits of liability in a 
contractual situation, but it holds the parties to the terms of their agreement." Id.32 
30
 Appellate Brief, at pp. 35-36. 
32
 Additional support for the argument that in the construction litigation context, contract 
principles override the tort principles in § 552, is found in City Express, Inc. v. Express Partners, 
959 P.2d 836 (Haw. 1998). The plaintiff, an owner in privity with the architect it sued for 
economic damages, had argued it could recover economic damages under Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 552(2). The Hawaii Supreme Court recognized that this Restatement section 
"contemplates a tort action for negligent misrepresentation by the party who contracts directly 
with the supplier of information." Id. at 839 & n.3. However, according to the court, "in the 
context of construction litigation regarding the alleged negligence of design professionals, a tort 
action for negligent misrepresentation alleging damages based purely on economic loss is not 
available to a party in privity of contract with a design professional." Id. at 840 (emphasis added). 
The court also stated: "In the context of construction litigation involving design professionals, 
sound policy reasons counsel against providing open-ended tort recovery to parties who have 
negotiated a contractual relationship." Id In support of its reasoning, the court repeatedly cited 
Berschauer/Phillips. and also relied on American Towers. Id at 839-840. 
27 
The Ohio Supreme Court also has rejected application of Restatement Section 552 
to contractor claims against a design professional and further explained the rationale for this 
approach: 
Although architects may anticipate that certain subcontractors will contribute to a 
construction project, the architect's services are generally extended to an 
unresolved class of persons unfixed in number. * * * Applying the Restatement in 
this context will encompass liability that is otherwise best suited for contract 
negotiations and assignment. 
Floor Craft, supra., 560 N.E.2d at 211. 
Finally, the application of Restatement Section 552 to circumstances such as those 
at bar is equivocated by the Restatement itself. Specifically, §766C provides: 
One is not liable for pecuniary harm not deriving from physical harm to the other, if 
that harm results from the actor's negligently 
(a) causing a third person not to perform a contract with the other, or 
(b) interfering with the other's performance of his contract or making the performance 
more expensive or burdensome, or 
(c) interfering with the other's acquiring a contractual relation with a third party.33 
33
 The Nevada Supreme Court has cited Restatement section 766C as support for the 
statement that under common law, "absent privity of contract or an injury to person or property, a 
plaintiff may not recover in negligence for economic loss." Local Joint Executive Board of Las 
Vegas. Culinary Workers Union. Local No. 226 v. Stern. 651 P.2d 637, 638 (Nev. 1982) (per 
curiam). Further, the Idaho Supreme Court in a products liability action cited a tentative draft of 
section 766C for the proposition that "[t]he economic expectations of parties have not 
traditionally been protected by the law concerning unintentional torts." Clark v. International 
Harvester Co.. 581 P.2d 784, 793 (Idaho 1978). Id. at 787-788. Comment (e) to section 766C, 
on the other hand, discusses the potential interplay between §552 and §766C. However, the 
applicability of this potential exception contained in Comment (e) to cases involving architects 
was expressly addressed and rejected by the Missouri Court of Appeals in Fleischer. 870 S.W.2d 
at 835-836. 
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F. SME's Other Arguments Against the Economic Loss Rule, 
SME asserts that application of the economic loss rule to its professional 
negligence claims would leave it without a remedy.34 Why this is so it does not say and, in fact, 
I 
this assertion is disingenuous. If SME has no remedy, how then was it able to assert a claim 
against Hughes-Hunt and reach a substantial settlement with Hughes-Hunt and the County? The 
truth is that the economic loss rule simply limits the protection of SME's economic expectations 
to that afforded SME in its contract with Hughes-Hunt, the very contract wherein those 
expectations were created. The same principle applies to the economic expectations of the 
County and Hughes-Hunt, whose claims have been assigned to SME. 
SME also contends that applying the economic loss rule to bar SME's negligence 
claims against Reaveley, Eppich, and the other defendants would somehow absolve those 
defendants of their alleged transgressions.35 Why this would be so SME again does not say, and 
the assertion is again disingenuous. The economic loss rule does not absolve design and 
construction defendants of negligence that causes purely economic harm (let alone personal injury 
or damage to other property). It simply says that such defendants are liable for such harm only to 
those with whom they contracted and only to the extent allowed under the terms of that contract 
and/or contract law. 
I Similarly, SME contends that the economic loss rule will dissuade SME and others 
similarly situated from revealing alleged design problems. Again, why this is so it does not say. 
The economic loss rule does not, or at least should not dissuade SME or others similarly situated 
34
 Brief of Appellant, at pp. 38-39. 
35
 Id at p. 39. 
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from giving notice of supposed design defects. Their contracts typically require them to call 
attention to any such problems and provide for additional compensation when they do so and are 
asked to correct the problem. Conversely, if they call attention to the problem and their concerns 
are ignored or rejected, they have no duty to correct the situation. In any event, nothing 
precludes SME from identifying its concerns, regardless of whether and how they are ultimately 
addressed. 
SME also argues that the traditional tort principles of causation and foreseeability 
prevent Reaveley and Eppich from being held responsible for more than their fair share of fault.36 
Allocation of fault is not the issue and, in any event, this argument begs the question. The 
economic loss rule is premised in part upon the notion that in design and construction one does 
not have a legal duty to protect the economic expectations of a third party because such 
protection is to be found in the contract wherein said expectations were created, because of the 
uncertain and indeterminate nature of the potential claimants, because of the lack of opportunity 
to knowingly and voluntarily assess and undertake a duty to protect a remote party's economic 
interests, and because of the indeterminate nature of purely economic damages in tort. 
Further, Utah's comparative fault statute, which defines "fault" as, inter alia, "any 
actionable breach of legal duty", purposefully excludes breach of contractual duties in recognition 
that apportionment of damages is inappropriate where parties have contracted for their economic 
expectations and risks. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37(2) (emphasis added). In short, Utah's 
comparative fault statute acknowledges that comparative fault concepts should not operate to 
infringe upon or alter that to which contracting parties have agreed. 
36
 Id. at p. 34, n. 11. 
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Finally, SME contends that the trial court by applying the economic loss rule to bar 
SME's claims against Reaveley and Eppich "ignore[d] an entire body of Utah case law [regarding 
professional malpractice]."37 In reality, neither the trial court's Order nor the American Towers 
decision, properly read, say this. 
A similar argument was addressed and rejected in 2314 Lincoln Park West 
Condominium Assoc, v. Mann. 555 N.E.2d 346, 351 (111. 1990). In that case, appellant also 
warned that application of the economic loss doctrine to plaintiffs claim of architectural 
malpractice "would upset settled principles of malpractice liability in other professions." Id at 
351. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected this argument as overbroad. Id. at 353. In doing so, it 
reasoned that the economic loss rule does not mean that recovery for economic losses is never 
available in professional malpractice actions. Rather, "the economic loss rule attempts to define 
the contours of duty." Id at 352. This means that when a plaintiff is suing for the benefit of its 
bargain rather than for a breach of a duty arising independently of the contract, recovery for 
economic losses is barred. See id; see also Maack, 875 P.2d at 580. Further, economic losses 
can be recovered in situations where personal injury or injury to other property is also suffered or 
where an intentional tort is committed. Id at 351-353. Finally, according to the Illinois Supreme 
Court, "other professional relationships are readily distinguishable from [the relationship between 
37
 Id at p. 27; SME cites Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & GunnelL Inc.. 
713 P.2d 55, 60 (Utah 1986), for the proposition that "an engineering firm hired by a general 
contractor could be liable in negligence without bodily injury or property damage to a party not in 
privity with the engineer but who reasonably and forseeably relied upon the engineer's 
professional competence." Appellant's Brief at p. 27. In fact, surveying services were at issue in 
Price-Orem. not design or construction engineering services. Further, the claimant in Price-Orem 
was an owner, the very type of entity whose negligence claim for purely economic loss was 
rejected in American Towers. 
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owner of a building and engineer/architect involved with construction of that building]." Id at 
353. 
Unlike the malpractice scenarios involving attorneys and accountants, a 
construction project is marked by multiple, detailed design and construction contracts, each of 
which is entered into at arm's-length and each of which establishes in detail the economic 
expectations and protections of the contracting parties. Under such circumstances the economic 
loss rule limits a contracting party's remedy for damage to these economic expectations to those 
afforded in the contract wherein the expectations were created. 
Significantly, the economic loss rule was not at issue in any of the Utah cases cited 
by SME in support of this argument. Further, in the vast majority of the cases cited by SME for 
this proposition, the claimant had privity of contract with the defendant professional. Further, the 
trial court's ruling in this case does not logically lead to SME's suggested result that design 
professionals are not liable to third parties suffering physical damage or injury to person or 
property caused by their professional negligence. Reaveley and Eppich have simply maintained, 
and the trial court has correctly recognized, that they have no legal duty to protect the purely 
economic interests of third party participants in the design and construction of a project. 
DL SME HAS NO ENFORCEABLE THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY 
CONTRACT RIGHTS AGAINST REAVELEY OR EPPICH, 
A. SME Has Failed to Demonstrate that It Has Enforceable Third-Party 
Contract Rights Against Reaveley or Eppich, 
SME argues that it has enforceable third-party contract rights against Reaveley and 
Eppich because: (i) the County-TVSA contract was expressly incorporated into the TVSA-
Reaveley contract, making the County an intended third-party beneficiary of the TVSA-Reaveley 
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contract, and SME, as assignor of the County, assumes that status;38 (ii) SME as subcontractor to 
ana assignee of Hughes-Hunt was an intended third-party beneficiary of the TVSA-Reaveley 
contract.39 However, none of these bases suffices as a matter of law for SME to qualify as an 
intended third-party beneficiary to any contract entered into by Reaveley or Eppich. 
The only contracts at issue are the TVSA-Reaveley and, apparently, the Reaveley-
Eppich contracts. SME has not and cannot offer sufficient evidence to support a prima facie 
showing that either of these contract clearly and affirmatively demonstrate an intent on the part of 
TVSA, Reaveley, or Eppich to confer a separate and distinct benefit upon SME, the County, or 
Hughes-Hunt. To have enforceable rights under the TVSA-Reaveley or Reaveley-Eppich 
contracts, SME must establish that it was an intended beneficiary of these contracts. American 
Towers, 930 P.2d at 1188. To do this, SME must show "[t]he [clear] intent of the contracting 
parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit' upon SME, the County, or Hughes-Hunt. Id. 
(quoting Ron Case Roofing, 773 P.2d at 1386) (emphasis added). "A third party who benefits 
only incidentally from the performance of a contract has no right to recover under that contract." 
American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1188 (citing Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur.. 854 P.2d 527, 537 
(Utah 1993)). Further: 
"[W]ith respect to construction contracts ... [i]t is not enough that the parties to 
the contract know, expect, or even intend that others will benefit from the 
construction of the building in that they will be users of it The contract must 
be undertaken for the plaintiffs direct benefit and the contract itself must 
affirmatively make this intention clear." 
38
 See Brief of Appellant, at pp.41-44. 
39
 See id. at pp. 46-48. 
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Id (quoting 115 Harbor Drive Condominium Ass'n v. Harbor Point. Inc.. 568 N.E.2d 365, 374-
75 (111. Ct. App. 1991)) (emphasis added). 
A clear majority of jurisdictions reject claims that thrid parties such as owners, 
contractors, or subcontractors are intended third party beneficiaries of design professional 
contracts: 
In most cases, courts have been unwilling to find that a contractor is an intended 
third-party beneficiary of a contract between a design professional and an owner. 
Generally, the courts conclude that the benefits of the contract between the design 
professional and the owner are intended only for the parties to the contract. Thus, 
the contractor is only an incidental and not an intended beneficiary of the 
contract To assert the standing of an intended beneficiary the contractor 
must produce evidence of an intent that the design professional agreed to 
assume a direct obligation to the contractor. 
Robert F. Cushman & G. Christian Hedemann, Architect and Engineer Liability, Claims Against 
Design Professionals. Wilev Law Publications. §6.3 (2d.Ed. 1995) (emphasis added).40 
B. Neither the County Nor Its Assignee SME Is An Intended Third-Party 
Beneficiary of the TVSA-Reavelev or Reavelev-Eppich Contracts, 
SME argues that by "expressly" making the County-TVSA contract part of their 
contract, TVS A and Reaveley intended to confer a separate and distinct benefit directly upon the 
40
 Accord, Valley Landscape Company, Inc. v. Rolland. 237 S.E.2d 120 (Va. 
1977)(landscape architect not third party beneficiary of owner-landscape architect contract -
contract did not clearly evidence such an intent); Detweiler Bros.. Inc. v. John Graham & Co.. 
412 F.Supp. 416 (E.D. Wash. 1976)(subcontractor not intended third party beneficiary of owner-
architect contract - contract did not evidence intent to confer direct benefit, applying Washington 
law); Collins Co. v. Citv of Decatur. 533 So.2d 1127 (Ala. 1988)(general contractor not intended 
third party beneficiary of owner-engineer contract - no evidence that contract was intended to 
benefit contractor); Linde Enterprises. Inc. v. Hazelton Citv Auth.. 602 A.2d 897 (Pa. Super. 
1992)(general contractor not intended third party beneficiary of owner-engineer contract -
contract did not evidence an intent to confer benefit of engineer's performance upon contractor, 
as opposed to owner). 
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County. The language SME relies upon certainly doesn't say this and the argument in any event 
fails because SME can not: 
1. identify even one specific benefit of Reaveley's performance; 
2. demonstrate that this benefit was separate and distinct from those conferred 
by Reaveley upon TVS A; and 
3. demonstrate that the benefit was to be conferred directly upon the County, 
as opposed to being conferred upon the County through TVSA as a part of 
TVSA's contracted performance. 
At best, SME has shown only that Reaveley and TVSA anticipated and perhaps even intended 
that Reaveley's performance of its contract with TVSA would, as a component of TVSA's 
performance, benefit the County. However, under Utah law, a showing that the contracting 
parties merely "know, expect, or even intend that others will benefit" from performance of a 
contract is not enough to establish enforceable third party beneficiary rights under that contract. 
American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1188. 
Nor has SME cited a single case wherein 'flow down' or 'conduit' language it 
relies on was interpreted as creating enforceable contract rights in third parties. This being said, 
flow down or conduit clauses are common in both design and construction subcontracts and are 
used to ensure that all duties and risks of a prime contractor associated with subcontracted work 
are assumed by the subcontractor as well. Therefore, the County, and SME as assignee, are not 
third-party beneficiaries to the TVSA-Reaveley contract and the summary judgment entered by 
the Trial Court below on this issue should be affirmed. 
35 
C. SME and Hughes-Hunt Are Not Intended Third-Party Beneficiaries of the 
TVSA-Reaveiey or Reavelev-Eppich Contracts, 
SME further alleges that SME and Hughes-Hunt were intended third party 
beneficiaries of, inter alia, the County-TVSA and TVSA-Reaveley contracts. Based on these 
contracts, SME claims that: (i) the TVSA-Reaveley contract was "expressly intended to benefit 
Hughes-Hunt, SME and other subcontractors, who are referred to generally" in that contract41; 
and (ii) that Reaveley promised in its contract with TVS A to "prepare and submit accurate plans 
and specifications, sufficient to allow Hughes-Hunt and SME and other subcontractors to rely 
thereon" and "to ensure that such plans and specifications would be buildable and in accordance 
with the professional standards" applicable to their services.42 Similarly, it also apparently alleges 
that Eppich made similar promises for the benefit of Hughes-Hunt, SME, et al in his employment 
agreement with Reaveley. Finally, it alleges that these promises "conferred benefits upon Hughes-
Hunt and SME ... separate and distinct from any benefits conferred upon TVS A and/or Salt Lake 
County."43 It does however not identify any of these benefits, or demonstrate that they were 
separate and distinct from those conferred upon TVS A and were conferred directly upon SME 
and Hughes-Hunt. 
A review of the documents comprising the TVSA-Reaveley and Reaveley-Eppich 
contracts reveals SME's allegations to be wholly without merit. Specifically: 
41
 Complaint % 95, R. 20. 
42
 Id at H. 96. R. 20. 
43
 Id 
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• None of the alleged promises upon which SME bases its claims against 
Reaveley are to be found in the TVSA-Reaveley contract documents or in the Reaveley-Eppich 
employment contract; 
• The TVSA-Reaveley contract documents do not make any reference to 
SME, Hughes-Hunt, or other specific subcontractors; 
• While there are numerous generic references to 'contractor', 
'subcontractor', or 'subcontractors' in the TVSA-Reaveley contract documents44, none of these 
references evidence an intent to confer a separate and distinct benefit upon Hughes-Hunt or SME 
specifically, or upon a contractor or any subcontractor generally; 
• To the contrary, all of the references demonstrate that Reaveley's services 
were intended to solely benefit TVS A by enabling TVS A to perform a portion of its work {i.e., 
that which it had subcontracted to Reaveley) for the County; 
• The TVSA-Reaveley contract specifically provides: 
It is understood and agreed that the CONSULTANT'S services under this 
Agreement... shall not create for the CONSULTANT any independent duties, 
liabilities, agreements, or rights to or with the contractor, subcontractor, their 
employees, or any third persons.45 
In short, by its very terms, the TVSA-Reaveley contract renounces SME's claim that it, Hughes-
Hunt, or anyone else is a third party beneficiary of that contract or that the contract imposes other 
duties upon Reaveley that run to anyone other than TVS A. 
44
 R. 247, 271-273, 277, 282, 283, 288, 298, 330, 331, 333-335, 341, 344. 
45
 Ex. A to Ex. 1 at Control No. R00028, % HI. A. 3. f (10). R. 272. 
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Simply stated, nothing in the TVSA-Reaveley contract clearly demonstrates, as 
required under American Towers, that TVS A and Reaveley intended to confer a separate and 
distinct benefit directly upon SME, Hughes-Hunt, or any other third party. Indeed, the TVSA-
Reaveley contract demonstrates an intent not to do so. At best, SME can establish only that 
Reaveley generally and genetically knew that a contractor and/or one or more subcontractors 
involved in constructing the Project would use Reaveley's design documents to build portions of 
the project. However, as held in American Towers, establishing merely that the contracting 
parties "know, expect, or even intend that others will benefit" from performance of a contract is 
not enough to establish enforceable third party beneficiary rights under that contract. American 
Towers. 930P.2d 1188* 
The cases cited by SME in support of its third-party beneficiary claims are to no 
avail. CO AC. Inc. v. Kennedy Engineers, et al.. 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Cal. App. 1977),47 COAC 
contracted with a water district to build a treatment facility for the district. The court found that 
the district had an implied duty under the contract to provide an environmental impact report to 
COAC to facilitate its construction project. The district retained Kennedy to prepare the EIR, and 
Kennedy allegedly prepared a defective EIR. The court found that the implied duty of the district 
46
 To the extent that Appellant still is alleging a third party beneficiary contract claim 
against Eppich, any such claim is even more clearly without merit. Nothing in the Reaveley-
Eppich employment agreement even remotely suggests that Reaveley and Eppich even 
contemplated third parties, let alone that they clearly and affirmatively contracted to confer a 
separate and distinct benefit directly upon a any third party. Nor is there any reference 
whatsoever in the contract (specific, generic or otherwise) to this project, to SME, Hughes-Hunt, 
or other subcontractors, or to 'contractor' or * subcontractors)'. 
47
 Brief of Appellant, at p. 47. 
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to CO AC was sufficient to support a third-party beneficiary claim of CO AC against Kennedy. Id. 
at 891-894. Here, no such implied duty is to be found to run from the County to SME. Further, 
the Utah Supreme Court in American Towers adopted a more restrictive standard than the one 
used by the California Court of Appeals, id. at 891-892, for claiming enforceable third-party 
beneficiary rights in the construction context. 
Further, Visintine & Co. v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R. Co.. 160 N.E.2d 
311 (Ohio 1959), is distinguishable because that case involved a third-party beneficiary claim in a 
co-prime contractor situation. Id at 312. Furthermore, the State who entered into both these 
contracts was found to be immune from a lawsuit for any alleged violation of the duties it 
assumed under its contract with the plaintiff Id at 314. These cases therefore are distinguishable 
on their facts and inapposite in this case. In sum, SME's third party beneficiary contract claims 
against Reaveley and Eppich simply do not and cannot pass muster under American Towers and 
summary judgment on all third-party beneficiary contract claims of SME against the Reaveley and 
Eppich must be affirmed. 
D. Public Policy, 
Allowing third-party beneficiary contract claims under the present facts, like 
allowing third party negligence claims for economic losses, would undermine the very foundations 
of a contract-intensive industry and be contrary to public policy. See, discussion on public policy 
supra at pp. 9-13. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the facts and authorities outlined supra, appellees Reaveley and Eppich 
respectfully request that this Court affirm the summary judgment entered in favor of appellees by 
the trial court below. 
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